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Quarantine Events
LaunchServices Quarantine Events database — every file downloaded by a quarantine-aware app, with timestamp, originating URL, and triggering bundle ID.
- Status
- available
- CLI plugin
- system.quarantine
- Categories
- system, security
Overview
When a user downloads a file with a quarantine-aware application — Safari, Chrome, Mail, AirDrop, Messages, and most email clients — macOS writes a row to the per-user QuarantineEventsV2 SQLite database. The row contains the source URL, the application that performed the download, and a timestamp. For incident responders, this is the single best ground-truth record of "where did this binary come from?"
Analysis Tips
LSQuarantineEventIdentifier: UUID also written into the file's xattrcom.apple.quarantine— links the database row to the on-disk fileLSQuarantineDataURLvsLSQuarantineOriginURL: Origin is the page that hosted the link; Data is the actual download URL. They often differ in attacker-driven downloadsLSQuarantineSenderName: Bundle ID of the downloading app — "com.apple.Safari", "com.tinyspeck.slackmacgap", etc.LSQuarantineEventTime: Cocoa epoch (seconds since 2001-01-01) — convert withUnix = Cocoa + 978307200- xattr survival: Even after the database row is gone, files often retain the
com.apple.quarantinexattr — check both sources
Related Artifacts
- Safari Browser - Browsing history corroborates the originating URL
- FSEvents - File creation events match the download timestamp
- Persistence Mechanisms - Trace a malicious agent's binary back to its download row
References
Data sources
QuarantineEventsV2SQLite
~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2
Every quarantined file with download timestamp, sender app, originating URL, and data URL